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The concepts of complexity and emergence have gained a wide intellectual and 
popular currency since their initial formulation in the 1960s and 1970s. In his influential 
survey Complexity: the emerging science at the edge of order and chaos (1993), M. Mitchell 
Waldrop suggests that this new paradigm can help to account for a variety of social, 
political, economic and natural phenomena that appear to defy conventional explanations. 
These include the remarkably rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in the 
late 1980s, the stock market crash of 1987, the emergence of complex living organisms, the 
evolution of intricate structures such as the human eye and kidney, and the fact of 
consciousness (Waldrop 1993: 10-11). The idea of complexity as a way of thinking about 
these phenomena refers not simply to the fact that they are self-evidently ‘complex’ in the 
common sense of the term, but rather that they demonstrate emergent properties of 
spontaneous self-organisation. As Peter Coveney explains, complexity is the study of the 
collective behaviour of a large number of basic interacting components in a system: ‘The 
complex phenomena that emerge from the dynamical behaviour of these interacting units 
are referred to as self-organizing’ (Coveney 2003: 1058). The fact that these phenomena 
emerge entirely from local interactions, without any reference to the global structure, 
indicates that complex systems have a form of coordination that is distributed rather than 
being localised in any centre of operations. Also, in a technical sense, self-organisation 
occurs in systems that are ‘dissipative’ and ‘nonlinear’: that is to say, unpredictable (‘non-
trivial’) structures and functions emerge in the productive zone that is at the so-called edge 
of chaos. This is ‘the constantly shifting battle zone between stagnation and anarchy, the 
one place where a complex system can be spontaneous, adaptive, alive’ (Waldrop 1992: 12). 
In many ways, thinking on complexity and emergence reverses the polarity of first-order 
cybernetics as an ontological exploration: rather than looking at the ways in which life has 
machine-like characteristics, complexity explores the ways in which a variety of complex 
structures – natural, societal, geographical – behave like organisms. 
This focus on the way in which systems are, as Waldrop puts it, ‘alive’ highlights the 
importance of biology and biological concepts in the early formulation of complexity. This 
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article draws on research presented in papers delivered at a panel on the Groupe de Dix – 
held at the Society for French Studies Conference and at the University of Exeter in July 2012, 
and subsequently at the University of Cambridge in September 2013 – in order to focus on 
the centrality of biology for Edgar Morin and Henri Atlan in their important contributions to 
the field of complexity. Referring in particular to Morin’s Le Paradigme perdu : la nature 
humaine (1973) and two key publications by Atlan, Entre le cristal et la fumée : essai sur 
l’organisation du vivant (1979) and La fin du tout génétique (1999), the article will explore 
the way in which their work converged around an innovative interpretation of the post-war 
molecular biology paradigm, challenging what they saw as the overly linear, mechanistic and 
reductionist framing of DNA and its role in the reproduction and development of living 
systems. This framing of molecular biology drew heavily on the growing importance of first-
order cybernetics and information theory in the post-war era which, in very broad terms, 
identified information – in addition to matter and energy – as a fundamental dimension of 
the natural world. The effect of information theory on the theorisation of life was twofold. 
First, it appeared to offer a resolution to the thorny issue of vitalism. That is to say, it was no 
longer necessary to think of living matter as containing some kind of animating vital spark: 
in short, life was matter plus energy and information. Second, first-order cybernetics 
explored the idea that life might have machine-like qualities. Morin and Atlan developed the 
concepts of complexity, emergence and self-organisation precisely in order to take these 
initial cybernetic insights further. For them, initial thinking on life information had offered 
ways of explaining reproduction and inheritance in non-vitalist terms, but it had had little to 
say about, for example, the emergence of consciousness. Such complex phenomena can 
only be understood, they argued, by exploring the capacity of living systems to self-organise 
in response to external stimuli and growing complexity. For these reasons, they explored 
ways of understanding information not simply in terms of transmission, but also as the 
construction of meaning within systems. For Atlan, a core preoccupation throughout his 
work has been the attempt to mobilise cybernetics and information theory in order to 
provide a materialist account of consciousness and intentionality. This article will look in 
particular at his sustained challenge to genetic determinism (‘le tout génétique’). It will also 
look at the ways in which, for Morin, complexity provides a conceptual frame for a 
reformulation of human ‘nature’. This project began to take shape for Morin in the 1970s, 
and it was influenced not only by his engagement with molecular biology bit also, as the 
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article will show, by new thinking in diverse fields such as anthropology, ethology and 
evolutionary theory.  
 
A new paradigm: ‘la fin de l’humanité insulaire’ 
Edgar Morin is one of the first thinkers to attempt to summarise and theorise the 
emergence of a new paradigm of complexity that challenged and expanded the 
deterministic, mechanistic focus of science by emphasising nonlinearity, disequilibrium, 
disorder and interaction. For Morin, complexity constitutes nothing less than a challenge to 
the central ontological and epistemological assumptions of the established paradigm of 
Western scientific rationality, which constructs knowledge according to principles of order, 
reversibility and linear causality, operating according to a clear epistemological distinction 
between subject and object. Although classical science has achieved major success by 
discovering the ‘simplicity’ of basic elements at the microscopic level, this methodology 
must now be supplemented with a willingness to engage with the nature of the complex 
and dynamic relations that exist between these elements. Along these lines, Morin has 
consistently explored the role of chance, disorder, and complex recursive causality, and he 
has argued that the world consists primarily of open systems that are characterised by flux 
and disorder: all living systems are threatened by disorder but are at the same time 
nourished by it (Morin 1973: 129). In contrast to classical science’s drive to eliminate 
subjectivity in favour of a rigorously objective approach to scientific knowledge, complexity 
draws on second-order cybernetics to emphasise the importance of the role of the 
observer. As far as the figure of the human is concerned, scientific rationality places the 
human subject in privileged position in relation the natural world. Both Christianity and 
humanism are built on the assumption that it is possible to escape or transcend, either in 
death or life, the constraints of the natural world (Morin 1973: 20-1). In this respect, 
Jacques Monod’s influential framing of the significance of molecular biology, Le hasard et la 
nécessité (1970), remains squarely within the classic paradigm of scientific rationality. For 
Monod, molecular biology provided a final confirmation that humanity was alone in the 
universe, condemned to the absurd Sisyphean task of creating meaning in the absence of 
any transcendental power.1 Furthermore, he emphasised that the ‘animist’ – as he put it – 
tendency to project human values onto the natural world was illusory. In short, the figure of 
the human was entirely isolated. So, although molecular biology strips ‘life’ of any 
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metaphysical dimensions, reducing it to physico-chemical interactions, the human subject 
maintains a position of splendid, if tragic, isolation. Although, as Morin emphasises, we may 
accept that – after Darwin – we are descended from primates, and also that – after 
molecular biology – our bodies are complex multicellular machines controlled by genes, we 
still accord a privileged position to the human as being somehow outside of nature. 
Complexity, in contrast, has sought to conceptualise the human as part of the natural world, 
forging a ‘new alliance’ with nature that finally draws the human out of its peculiar 
conceptual isolation. As Atlan acknowledges, this challenge to the insularity of the human 
has much in common with Michel Foucault’s prediction, in Les Mots et les choses, that ‘man’ 
might be on the point of disappearing, like a ‘face drawn in the sand’ (Foucault 1966: 398 & 
Atlan 1979: 133). Whereas Foucault, writing at the height of structuralism’s intellectual 
influence, placed his faith in language as the area in which this breakthrough would take 
place, biology offered itself as a more fruitful area for thinkers like Morin and Atlan. The 
task, as they saw it, was to place the human squarely in the natural world without being 
drawn into the sort of biologism that has characterised, for example, sociobiological views 
of human behaviour as being primarily genetically determined.  
As the article will show, this attempt to break down the conceptual insularity of the 
human is the main aim of Morin’s Le Paradigme perdu : la nature humaine (1973). This was 
an important publication for Morin in that it constituted an attempt to summarise the 
period of intense reflection on biology, culture and evolution that he had undertaken in 
previous years. It also pointed forward to the long-term project of bringing to together 
biology and the human sciences in a highly ambitious, conceptually coherent synthesis. The 
book grew directly out the international conference on ‘L’Unité de l’homme’ held at 
Royaumant in 1972 that was in large part inspired by Morin’s friendship and intellectual 
dialogue with the eminent French molecular biologist Jacques Monod (Morin & Piatttelli-
Palmarini 1974). The overall aim of the conference was to explore the links between 
‘biological invariants and cultural universals’, and it brought together researchers from a 
wide variety of fields, including molecular biology, anthropology, ethology, physics, 
cybernetics and sociology. As Claude Fischler emphasises in a piece written thirty-three 
years later, the conference marked a pivotal moment in transdisciplinary dialogue and 
signalled a shift away from the dominant approaches of structuralism and Marxism in 
French intellectual life (Fischler 2005/2006). In raising fundamental questions concerning 
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culture and nature it inspired Morin to set out a conceptual framework for human evolution 
that incorporated new insights in the fields of molecular biology, cybernetics, ethology and 
anthropology.  
 
Molecular biology: a dogmatic paradigm 
 As indicated already, a key component of the context of Morin and Atlan’s attempts 
to formulate a new paradigm of complexity was the natural philosophy associated with 
molecular biology. Crick and Watson’s discovery of the double-helix structure of DNA and 
Jacob and Monod’s work on gene regulation had been incorporated into a linear, 
mechanistic account of the three main dynamics of life: the reproduction of hereditary 
characteristics from generation to generation; the development of living organisms from 
conception and an embryonic phase through to adulthood; and the overall process of 
evolution. These processes, which had previously been explained in terms of the 
enigmatically vitalist properties of living matter and the direct influence of environmental 
stimulus, could now be described exclusively in physico-chemical terms. That is to say, DNA 
is inherited from the genome of each parent, and the nucleotide bases that make up DNA 
macromolecules act as coded information that is translated into sequences of amino acids, 
which in turn specify the structure and properties of proteins in the cell. Crucially, molecular 
biology quickly formulated its own so-called ‘central dogma’, according to which the 
information flow in the cell does not permit for any transfer of information back from 
protein to DNA (so-called ‘backtranslation’). According to this model of information transfer 
there can be no direct influence exerted by the environment on DNA during the lifetime of 
an organism. The concept of the central dogma was formulated in the 1950s by Francis 
Crick, who asserted that once information has passed into a protein ‘it cannot get out again’ 
(Crick 1958: 153). Consequently, as far as the evolution of life is concerned, molecular 
biology was integrated into a broadly neo-Darwinian model, according to which 
evolutionary change results from random genetic mutations producing phenotypic 
variations that are subjected to environmental pressures. Evolutionary change occurs by 
virtue of the steady accumulation of new features that allow for adaptational advantages: 
the vast scale of evolutionary time means that the random generation of genetic difference 
has the effect of sculpting organisms in minute detail. In summary, this model is rigidly 
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gene-centric and selectionist rather than instructionist, in that no environmental effects on 
the phenotype can be fed back into the germ-line in heritable form.  
Morin and Atlan argued that the theorisation of this new field by its main 
practitioners limited its potential as the basis for a new natural philosophy. For them, 
molecular biology misrecognised its own potential, effectively locking itself into an 
inadequate and anachronistic determinist paradigm. The preoccupation with defeating 
vitalism had pulled it down a mechanistic route, preventing it from exploring the full 
potential of the new paradigm of complexity that lay before it (Atlan 1979: 195). Morin 
likens molecular biology’s accidental discovery of complexity to Columbus who, in looking 
for India, actually found America (Morin 1973: 28). In order to properly explore the new 
continent that molecular had uncovered Morin and Atlan sought to expand on what they 
regarded as molecular biology’s limited understanding of cybernetics and information 
theory. Rather than focusing on the linear transmission of information, they considered the 
ways in which information functions to facilitate meaning and interpretative dynamics in 
complex systems. In this sense, they sought to replace the rather loosely-defined concepts 
of ‘code’ and ‘programme’ favoured by molecular biology with models that draw on the 
emerging conceptualisation of the brain as a complex distributed system. As the article will 
show, in addition to self-organisation, the concept ‘order from noise’ was central to this 
reassessment of molecular biology. 
 
Complexity & molecular biology 
Morin’s critical engagement with molecular biology emerged from what was a 
particularly intense period of intellectual development for him, as he explains in the 
foreword to Le Paradigme perdu : la nature humaine (1973). He emphasises that 
fundamental questions relating to biology had always informed his thinking in a variety of 
ways up to this point. Initially, he says, these were the sort of naïve reflections that occur in 
childhood and adolescence, but these basic questions concerning the relationship between 
the human and nature took on a new significance for him when he was exposed to a series 
of new intellectual influences in the late 1960s. A key phase in Morin’s thinking on biology 
and complexity began in 1968, when Jacques Robin invited him to join the Groupe des Dix. 
Then, in 1969, Morin was invited by Jonas Salk and Jacques Monod to spend a year at the 
Salk Institute in California, where he developed further his thinking on biology, ecology, 
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information and systems theory. He continued this line of research when he returned to 
France, at which point he was particularly influenced by François Jacob’s analysis of the 
evolution of biological concepts in La Logique du vivant (1970), and he was introduced to 
the principle of ‘order from noise’ by Henri Atlan,2 who also pointed him to Von Neumann’s 
theory of automata (Fischler 2008: 165). In addition to this, he spent time at MacGill 
University in Montreal, where avidly read new material on self-organising systems that was 
unavailable in France at the time (Morin 1973: 12-13).  
This intense period of research, conversation and reading was clearly a pivotal 
episode in Morin’s thinking, orientating him towards a general method of complexity. His 
diary entries in Journal de Californie (1970), written throughout his time at the Salk 
Institutue, provide fascinating insights into the ways in which biology was of central 
importance to the development of his thinking. In a preface to the 1983 edition of the book 
he reflects in a general sense on the fact that the intellectual atmosphere of California 
allowed him to make connections between life and ideas in ways that were not possible in 
France, where a radical disjunction between the two categories was the norm (Morin 1970: 
7). A key preoccupation for Morin is the relative isolation of biology as a discipline, and the 
possibility that it may now be possible to make new connections between biology, 
anthropology, sociology, etc. (Morin 1970: 42-3). Morin’s thinking draws him towards to the 
possibility of exploring the links and articulations between the different systems that 
comprise life, as well as the different logics of structure and event (Morin 1970: 54-7). In 
what he recognises as a significant breakthrough in his thinking, he arrives at the 
formulation of ‘la vie comme système événementalisé’: a system capable of responding to 
both internal and external chance events and of integrating them into a flexible structure 
(Morin 1970: 58). Life, he claimed, can be described as a dialectical relation between 
conservation and evolution (Morin 1970: 107). The significance of Morin’s engagement with 
molecular biology is emphasised by Jacques Robin, writing about the Groupe des dix 
sessions with Monod and Jacob in the early 1970s. Robin remembers these as ‘soirées 
exaltantes’, marked by a certain liberty of expression and robust intellectual exchanges. At 
this time, he recalls, the new, apparently all-conquering field of molecular biology 
confidently asserted a determinist perspective, according to which a line of linear causality 
ran from DNA, through proteins to characteristics in the organism. Morin, however, inspired 
by his time in California, surprised the group by expressing serious reservations about this 
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overly ‘linear’, determinist paradigm. He warned against over-simplification, predicting that 
the genome would come to be seen as much more complex than this approach suggested 
(Robin 1990: 85).  
Henri Atlan was also questioning the reductionism and finalism of molecular biology, 
and he summarises his thinking on this subject in a short chapter in Entre le cristal et la 
fumée, ‘Dogmes et découvertes cachées de la nouvelle biologie’ (Atlan 1979: 13-27). Like 
Morin, he challenges Jacques Monod’s neo-Darwinist, reductionist framing of molecular 
biology in Le Hasard et la necessité (1970). Having dismissed vitalism, Monod’s core thesis is 
that teleological explanations of heredity relying on final causes can now be replaced by the 
concept of teleonomy. Heredity and evolution as teleonomic processes, Monod argues, only 
give the appearance of being governed by final causes: they are in fact the realisation of a 
genetic programme, contained in the genome, which has been sculpted over time by the 
dual forces of random mutation and natural selection. For Atlan, this mechanistic framing 
does not ultimately address the issues raised by the notions of code, information and 
programme associated with the conceptualisation of molecular biology. Instead, these 
cybernetic concepts open up profound questions of an ontological, not to say metaphysical, 
nature. Atlan suggests that the finalism observed in biology can be explained by drawing on 
new ways of thinking about living systems as complex and self-organising. Greater levels of 
complexity in living systems would allow them to react to environmental stimuli and to 
develop in ways that are not pre-programmed into genetic material. Atlan points to the 
importance of the work of Ilya Prigogine (1979) and his collaborators on the self-organising 
properties of far-from-equilibrium systems, his own work on order from noise, and the 
parallels that Jean Piaget (1967) explores between biological systems and the self-organising 
nature of learning. 
In ‘Finalité du complexe’, written in 1990, Atlan revisits the issue of finalism and 
intentionality in biology in the light of more recent models of evolution. He looks in 
particular at the concept of the ‘selfish gene’, associated primarily with Richard Dawkins. 
Although the principle of final causes is apparently challenged by the idea that the evolution 
of phenotypic forms is simply a by-product of the drive of genes to ensure their own 
replication, the concept of the selfish gene retains a strong sense of intentionality. Genes 
apparently ‘choose’, for ‘egotistical’ reasons, the phenotypical expressions that are best 
adapted to their programme of reproduction (Atlan 1990: 242). For Atlan, the selfish gene is 
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the biological substrate of sociobiology, which he dismisses as a drily one-dimensional 
materialist view of evolution. He suggests that, rather than slipping into theories of 
intentionality by using ill-advised metaphors, it would be more productive to take a cue 
from recent work in ethology, behavioural biology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) and to 
acknowledge the unavoidable fact of intentionality. These fields show that intentionality is 
an emergent property, and AI is crucial in this respect because, as Atlan emphasies, the fact 
that a machine can replicate aspects of intentionality and consciousness make it more 
difficult to sustain idealist notions of these properties (Atlan 1990: 244). He suggests that 
the idea of non-intentional play [‘le jeu’] constitutes the best model within which to 
understand the emergence of intentionality at certain levels of complexity. So, rather than 
seeing evolution and the development of individual organisms as being in some way 
programmed or as unfolding according to a pre-established plan, the idea of play conveys 
the way in which a non-directed dynamic can lead to emergent properties of intentionality. 
Crucially, this is a game in which the rules are constantly changing (Atlan 1990: 245-6). Atlan 
recalls a conversation – presumably at one of the Groupe des dix sessions devoted to 
molecular biology – that captures in summary form the way in which the Groupe was 
exploring ways of thinking that challenged the assumptions of the molecular paradigm 
(Atlan 1990: 245). François Jacob replied to a question regarding final causes in the natural 
world by saying that the ‘dream’ of a bacterium is to make two bacteria, to which Morin 
apparently responded in turn by suggesting that the dream might simply be to ‘enjoy [jouir] 
its metabolism’. Atlan provided a slightly different perspective which, in his opinion, avoided 
any trace of finalism: organisation in living organisms can only be described in terms of 
physico-chemical interactions. The ‘dream’ of a bacterium is simply to achieve 
thermodynamic equilibrium: in other words, to die (Atlan 1990: 245). Death, in this sense, is 
synonymous with disorder and noise which, Atlan emphasises, lies at the heart of vital 
processes. He summarises this view by means of a neat reversal of Bichat’s vitalist definition 
of life as the set of functions that resist death. For Atlan, in contrast, life is the set of 
functions capable of using death (Atlan 1979: 278).  
 
Self-organisation and order from noise 
 Atlan’s emphasis on disorder and noise leads him to formulate the principle of order 
from noise, which is central to the understanding of self-organisation. In a broad sense, 
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disorder can be defined as any phenomenon that cannot be predicted deterministically or 
mechanically, and noise refers to any perturbation that interferes with the transmission of 
information (Morin 1973: 127). However, the concept of order from noise and its relation to 
self-organisation requires a somewhat more technical explanation. Atlan’s challenge to the 
metaphorical uses of information theory is based on a critique of Claude E. Shannon’s highly 
influential probabilistic theory of information. Shannon defines information as a particular 
arrangement of elements that is distinct from all other possible arrangements and that can 
be transmitted as a sequence. The process of transmission can be disrupted by random 
perturbations, i.e. noise. Redundancy, in the shape of repeated elements, can help to 
protect the fidelity of the transmission against the disruptive effects of noise, although 
redundancy of this kind necessarily entails a cost. The main problem with Shannon’s 
formulation, according to Atlan, is that it neglects the issues of meaning and the creation of 
new information. For Shannon, whose primary focus was the preservation of the message, 
noise is destructive and redundancy is a cost that is paid in order to protect against noise. 
From the perspective of self-organisation, however, noise actually creates new information, 
and a certain amount of redundancy is required to facilitate change: ‘Redundancy for 
communication engineers is a burden. It is a bonus for biologists’ (Atlan and Cohen 1998: 
712). Atlan explains this principle in Entre le cristal et la fumée by means of a simple model 
of a system S comprising two subsystems A and B. As far as the overall quantity of 
information in the system is concerned, the optimum level of operation for the system as a 
whole entails a degree of transmission between A and B, but also a certain number of errors 
(Atlan 1979: 46-7). The positive effects of noise are maximised in a highly complicated 
system with multiple direct and indirect connections between subsystems: ‘Cette 
augmentation peut être alors utilisée pour la réalisation de performances plus grandes, 
notamment en ce qui concerne les possibilités d’adaptation à des situations nouvelles, grâce 
à une plus grande variété des réponses possibles à des stimuli diversifiés et aléatoires de 
l’environnement’(Atlan 1979: 49).  
In this way, noise is a necessary stimulus to a dynamic of self-organisation that can 
only function in open systems, since closed systems are inevitably subject to entropy when 
noise occurs in the system. Self-organising systems, in contrast, function both despite and 
with noise (Morin 1973: 127-8). They are able to do this because they are open systems, 
which have the capacity to constantly retrieve organisation from a state of disorganisation: 
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in fact they require a ‘nourishing disequilbrium’ in order to maintain this state of stability 
and continuity (Morin 2005: 30). Living systems can overcome the entropy that is produced 
within the system by responding to the forces of disorganisation that come from the 
environment. Consequently, open systems must be considered in the context of the 
environment that is both part of the system whilst remaining exterior to it (Morin 2005: 32). 
The capacity to use noise also depends upon the fact that complex systems can, as it were, 
observe themselves. What appears to be redundancy or noise at one level of organisation 
can be seen as entirely coherent from the point of view of a higher-level observer. That is to 
say, the role of observer can be undertaken by a higher level of organisation within the 
system. So, from the perspective of a cell, any noise in that occurs in the transmissions of 
information that constitute the cell is necessarily negative, but from the wider perspective 
of the organ within which the cell functions this noise is positive, in that variety potentially 
increases the overall regulatory performance of cells in the organ (Atlan 1979: 69-70). The 
idea that meaning is generated by the capacity of a system to observe itself means that 
complexity theory is able to develop the rather loose linguistic metaphors of molecular 
biology in a more nuanced manner. Atlan argues, for example, that the self-organising 
capacity of the human immune system functions like a conversation: a dynamic process that 
adjusts to constantly changing circumstances: ‘These changing requirements are abstracted 
into the chemical language of the immune system. The ongoing integration of germline and 
somatic information in one’s body is the essence of the self’ (Atlan & Cohen 1998: 717). 
 
Atlan: La fin du tout génétique 
Throughout his career Atlan has challenged the idea of a genetic programme, and he 
summarises his objections, particularly in the light of new developments in the field of 
epigenetics, in La fin du tout génétique (1999). The reductionist tout génétique paradigm 
has held wide currency for the past three decades or so, and it culminates, at the very end 
of the twentieth century, in the Human Genome project, which conceives of the genome as 
the ‘essence’ of life: the basic idea that ‘everything is in the genes’. This essentially 
preformationist notion that genes contain a programme for the organism – a programme 
for life – has been reinforced by a reductionist mode of scientific practice that has operated 
according to the ‘streetlight effect’. Like the proverbial fool who looks for his keys under the 
streetlight, although he knows that he lost them elsewhere, because ‘this is where the light 
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is’, genetic research has sought ‘genes for’ any number of characteristics and behaviours. 
This type of research is favoured, Atlan claims, precisely because it avoids the problematic 
analysis of multiple, interrelated determinants (Atlan 1999: 58). The properties of 
pleiotropy, redundancy and complexity that have been revealed by genomic research 
challenge the core assumptions of molecular biology. Pleiotropy refers to the fact that the 
same gene can have different functions in a variety of organisms and at different stages of 
development. Redundancy was identified as early as the 1970s in the shape of repetitive 
DNA sequences that are non-coding and the function of which is unknown. At a later stage, 
repetitive coding sequences were also identified. In a more general sense, the interaction 
between the genome as an overall structure and the state of expression of the genes has 
been shown to be more complex than the determinist paradigm would suggest (Atlan 1999: 
20-21). Genome sequencing has, for example, shown that there are significant similarities at 
the genetic level between very different species (Atlan 2010: 104-105). Also, experiments 
with ‘knocked-out’ genes have produced either no apparent effect in phenotype or have led 
to significant and unexpected changes. In short, the way in which a gene is expressed in an 
organism cannot be deduced in any straightforward way from knowledge of the DNA 
sequence (Cohen, Atlan, Efroni 2016: 3). 
Atlan has highlighted the growing recognition of the significance of epigenetic 
inheritance and embryonic development. Both depend upon phenomena that are already 
known and observed, but have tended to be neglected within the dominant molecular 
paradigm. In the case of epigenetic inheritance, it is clear from the differentiation of somatic 
cell lines that, at the moment of cellular division, it is not simply the DNA sequence that is 
transmitted, but also the state of activity of the sequence. Despite the fact that this 
phenomenon is, of course well-established, since it facilitates the development of the 
differentiated somatic cells, it was thought unlikely that it might apply to germ cells. 
However, there is evidence that certain states, such as DNA methylation, can be transmitted 
(Atlan 1999: 38-39: Atlan 2011: 109). Research has also revealed what appear to be 
mechanisms of epigenetic inheritance at work in human populations. For example, the 
children and grandchildren of women who experienced the ‘Dutch Hunger Winter’ of 1944-
45 have suffered a high number of pathologies and developmental issues. As Atlan suggests, 
epigenetic inheritance of this kind calls into question the central Weismannian tenet of neo-
Darwinist genetics, according to which there is a strict distinction between soma and 
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germen, preventing the inheritance of acquired characteristics (Atlan 2010: 111). As far as 
embryonic development is concerned, Atlan points to the fact that, in Drosophilia, it has 
been shown that maternal RNA directs the initial development of the embryo before the 
genome expresses itself (Atlan 1999: 41-44). Cloning techniques have also called into 
question the notion of a genetic programme, since they have shown that the nucleus of an 
adult cell can be reprogrammed epigenetically (Atlan 2010: 103).  
Rather than fetishising DNA as the essence of life, it should be seen, Atlan suggests, 
as a ‘dead’ molecule, which has no autonomous power to reproduce and make copies of 
itself or, for that matter, anything else. The presence of active molecules – proteins and RNA 
– is required for any activity to take place (Atlan 1999: 54). In light of this, the idea of the 
genetic programme is, Atlan argues, a metaphor that has outlived its usefulness, and it 
should now be supplemented with a new model of genomic DNA as data within the 
distributed system of the organism. Whereas a programme is a plan for a sequence of 
events, a blueprint for a specific set of tasks to be completed, biologists working in the field 
of molecular biology are all too aware that the genome is ‘ambiguous, incoherent and 
indefinite’, and that it is neither autonomous nor ‘complete’ in the sense of a programme 
(Cohen, Atlan, Efroni 2016: 2). Similarly, DNA does not have significant syntactical or 
semantic language-like properties (Atlan 1999: 24). It might more usefully be thought of as a 
vocabulary: that is to say, a reservoir of information that mutates and evolves over time, 
and which is transmitted from generation to generation. Expanding the metaphor further, a 
vocabulary – like DNA – can be expressed in different ways to generate meaning, but 
individual language users are required to carry out this process (Cohen, Atlan, Efroni 2016: 
7). Locating DNA within a complex distributed system marks a significant break with the 
central dogmas of molecular biology: there appear to be molecular bearers of information 
that are not entirely reducible to DNA. At the macro-level of evolution Atlan challenges the 
neo-Darwinian tenet that evolution improves the genome by the steady accumulation of 
small errors. Rather than generating improvement, evolution accumulates complexity and 
thus generates new information (Cohen, Atlan, Efroni 2016: 6). 
 
Le Paradigme perdu : la nature humaine 
  The article will conclude with a brief consideration of the way in which Morin 
attempts, in Le Paradigme perdu : la nature humaine, to apply the principles of complexity 
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and self-organisation to evolution, and in this way to challenge the dominant association of 
a reductionist molecular biology with a rigidly neo-Darwinist view of evolution (the so-called 
modern synthesis). Biological and cultural evolution are considered as interconnected 
processes that are conceptualised in terms of the interaction of open systems, the interplay 
of order and disorder, the principle of order from noise, and the dynamic of growing 
complexity. In the course of his argument Morin seeks to overturn established causal 
relations in a number of ways. In a general sense, it is not simply the case that the 
development of a larger brain facilitates the emergence of more sophisticated human 
culture, but also that the emergence of culture itself promotes the development of a larger 
brain. Morin’s describes his non-linear, non-mechanistic approach as a form of a complex – 
in both the common and technical sense – diagramme, an anti-model, of the hominisation 
process (Atlan 1973: 104).  
As Atlan notes in his detailed assessment of Le Paradigme perdu, Morin’s focus on 
new capacities that emerge in the process of evolution, and which are effectively activated 
at a later stage when they become adaptationally advantageous, draws directly on the self-
organisational principle of productive redundancy, and of order from noise (Atlan 1979: 
203). Morin is attempting to recover and reconstitute the scattered pieces of ‘human 
nature’ which has up to this point been fragmented by the opposition between nature and 
culture (Atlan 1979: 192). Philosophically, the idea of a human nature has, Morin suggests, 
been relegated over time to that of a kind of material substrate, a ‘matière première’ that is 
moulded by the forces of culture and society: an inherently conservative phenomenon that 
must be modified in order to achieve progress and social change: ‘Ainsi, de toutes parts, 
vidée de vertus, de richesse, de dynamisme, la nature humaine est devenue un résidu 
amorphe, inerte, monotone : c’est ce dont l’homme s’est soustrait et nullement ce qui le 
fonde’ (Morin 1973: 20). Although there have been serious philosophical attempts to 
theorise the human in terms of the natural world and natural processes, notably by Marx, 
Spencer and Freud, the general tenor of anthropology has been to separate culture from 
biology (Morin 1973: 23-24). 
Morin argues that, as well as directing biological understanding to the micro-level of 
the physico-chemical realm, molecular biology also, somewhat counterintuitively, points to 
the importance on the macro-level of the cultural and anthropological realms. So, in 
contrast to the neo-Darwinist model of evolution driven by genetic mutation and adaptive 
 15 
 
selection, he describes the process of hominisation as one of complex morphogenesis in 
which genetics, environment, culture, individual and species interact in a variety of ways 
(Morin 1973: 64-7; 102-3). Whereas, for Lamarckian or Darwinian models of evolution the 
environment is simply a formative or selective ‘moule géo-climatique’, he conceives of the 
relationship between a living system and an ecosystem as a co-productive dynamic between 
two open systems (Morin 1973: 30-32). In the course of elaborating this model of human 
evolution Morin uses ideas taken from complexity to challenge the basic assumption that 
both cultural and biological evolution are processes of emerging order and rationality. So, 
for example, hominisation only appears to be logical and orderly because the disorder of the 
process of evolution, in the form of blind alleys, redundancies and periods of stasis, is 
forgotten (Morin 1973: 102). 
Morin begins his survey by considering on what was, in the early 1970s, relatively 
recent research on primates (chimpanzees, baboons, macaques), which showed that 
anthropoid social structures were more complex than had previously been thought. For 
Morin, this social complexity emphasises the pervasive presence of ‘noise’ – in the shape of 
uncertainty, indeterminacy and conflict – in forms of society that must have predated 
human societies in evolutionary terms (Morin 1973: 37). These anthropoid societies 
demonstrate the ‘Brownian motion’, or noise, of the incomplete integration of individuals, 
unresolved aggression and generalised conflict that provides a certain ‘metabolic richness’ 
(Morin 1973: 45-6). In this way, Morin suggests that humans have not only inherited 
biological features from primates, but also cultural features. He also draws on research 
carried out in the late 1960s and early 1970s that revealed previously unsuspected linguistic 
capacities in chimpanzees. As well as showing that chimpanzees can use a basic gestural 
language in order to enter into dialogue with humans, the research demonstrated a sense of 
self-identity and reflexive, logical thinking associated with high-level language skills. Morin 
concludes that, in evolutionary terms, chimpanzees do not lack the cerebral capacity for 
language, but rather the purely physical glottal aptitude and the environmental influence of 
social stimulation required to promote the development of a more highly developed 
linguistic system (Morin 1973: 52-54) 
He then moves on to a general outline of the humanisation process, which comprises 
three main dynamics: cerebralisation; juvenilisation and culturisation. With the move to the 
savannah an increasingly complex relationship develops between the ecosystem and 
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hominems (Morin 1973: 70). The emergence of language as a complex meta-system 
constitutes a crucial evolutionary leap, facilitating the development of culture as a source of 
complexity. Sociocultural evolution and the development of the brain are mutually 
supportive, in that sociocultural ‘complexification’ maximises the use of brain capacity, 
which in turn favours mutations that produce new cerebral aptitudes (Morin 1973: 94). 
The large brain of homo sapiens functions as a system which generates both order and 
disorder, and the ‘madness’ of homo sapiens provides a creative source of noise. The 
evidence of burial tombs and paintings indicates emergence of a profound, complex 
consciousness of time. This, in turn, gives rise to a growing realism and the development of 
myth and imagination (Morin 1973: 109). Uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the 
relationship between the brain and environment now become crucial. The necessity of 
selecting between solutions and approaches introduces the possibility of error. Error, in 
short, is part of human nature (Morin 1973: 120). The development of homo sapiens is also 
marked by a psychological and affective eruption of violence: ‘La violence, circonscrite chez 
les animaux à la défense et à la prédation alimentaire, se déchaîne chez l’homme, hors du 
besoin’ (Morin 1973: 122). In summary, the evolution of homo sapiens is characterised by a 
massive increase in disorder. Darwinism and anthropology cannot adequately account for 
the development of these characteristics: ‘L’homme est fou-sage. La vérité humaine 
comporte l’erreur. L’ordre humain comporte le désordre’ (Morin 1973: 126).  
The key to understanding the process of hominisation is the ‘complexification’ of the 
brain, and the qualitative leap that constitutes the emergence of homo sapiens opens up a 
realm of hypercomplexity. As a hypercomplex system the human brain is characterised by 
high levels of flexibility in terms of hierarchy, specialisation and centralisation, and it is 
orientated primarily towards heuristic and strategic activity (Morin 1973: 130). As the brain 
achieves a certain degree of autonomy from the constraints of genetics, it is able to respond 
to chance events and incorporate noise. At the same time, its own internal functions 
become more ‘disordered’: in short, it is prone to error and disorder. The brain is ‘le centre-
fédérateur-intégrateur’, which mediates systemic links between the biological, cultural and 
spiritual spheres. These spheres are not compartmentalised orders organised in a hierarchy, 
but rather profoundly interconnected systems. Consequently, there are intimate and 
surprising connections between aspects of human life that appear to be entirely 
unconnected and irreducible. So, for example, sexuality, which appears to be the ‘most 
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genetic’ sphere, is also profoundly symbolic and cultural. Morin claims that Freud is, in this 
sense, one of the great analysts of complexity, in that he explored the encroachment of 
sexuality on all mental activity and the reciprocal effect of the superior cortex on sexuality 
(Morin 1973: 146). The growing influence of the brain as a mediating centre means that 
cerebral ‘noise’ is projected onto society. In contrast to the idea of a process of human 
‘enlightenment’, Morin emphasises the unstable, volatile nature of the development of 
human consciousness: ‘La conscience n’est pas la lumière qui éclaire l’esprit et le monde, 
mais c’est la lueur ou le flash qui éclaire la brèche, l’incertitude, l’horizon. Elle tend à 
éliminer l’erreur, mais pour illuminer l’errance’ (Morin 1973: 153). 
Although Atlan admires the attempt to trace the contours of a new paradigm of 
complexity in Le paradigm perdu, he suggests that Morin has a tendency to privilege the 
creative possibilities of disorder, and consequently neglects the importance of stabilising 
mechanisms of repetition and reproduction. Atlan detects in this respect the influence of 
the radical politics of the 1960s and early 1970s (Atlan 1979: 200-201). He points in 
particular to Morin’s ‘fascination’ with human error towards the end of the book as the 
point at which Morin equates the removal of constraints with hypercomplexity in contrast 
to the more subtle analysis of the complex relations between autonomy and dependence 
that characterised the earlier parts of the book (Atlan 1979: 212). Morin responded to 
Atlan’s critique by further refining and developing his own distinctive interpretation of order 
from noise in the first two books of his multi-volumed Méthode (Morin: 1977 & 1980). 
 
Conclusion 
Morin and Atlan have made a highly significant contribution to the shift away from 
reductionism in biology towards a paradigm of complexity. They challenged the inherent 
reductionism of the dominant paradigm of molecular biology that was formed in the 1950s 
and 1960. They did this by emphasising the importance of noise as a source of order, and by 
reframing the notion of information in the context of sense and interpretation. Information, 
as Morin explains, only exists when it is interpreted by living beings, and is in this way 
inseparable from life (Morin 2005: 145). Their conceptual development of the relationship 
between life, information and sense continues to resonate in the field of biology. The notion 
that organisms always exist in an environment from which they receive information is now 
commonplace, as is the idea of emergent properties that cannot be predicted from a 
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knowledge of the linear, mechanistic interactions between the constituent components of a 
system. Contemporary neuroscience, for example, is predicated on the assumptions that 
the brain is a complex, nonreducible system in which interactions occur both upwards and 
downwards between multiple levels, and that consciousness is an emergent property of 
these processes. For Morin in particular, this engagement with biology in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s proved to be pivotal in the overall development of his thinking on complexity. 
This ‘tournant biologique’ allowed him to address the fundamental question of what he saw 
as the reductive opposition between nature and culture. Le Paradgime perdu attempted to 
understand human evolution as both a cultural and a natural phenomenon, and he drew 
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1 Monod uses a lengthy quotation from Camus’ Le mythe de Sisyphe (1942) as an epigraph – along with a 
quotation from Democritus – for Le Hasard et le nécessité. The quotation closes as follows: 
Cet univers désormais sans maître ne lui paraît ni stérile ni futile. Chacun des grains de cette pierre, 
chaque éclat minéral de cette montagne pleine de nuit, à lui seul forme un monde. La lutte elle-même 
vers les sommets suffit à remplir un cœur d’homme. Il faut imaginer Sisyphe heureux.
2 Morin talks in Brigitte Chamak’s Le Groupe des dix (1997) about the importance of his time at the Salk 
Institute and about his friendship with Jacques Monod. He also mentions that his association with Atlan dates 
back to the early 1960s (Chamak 1997: 227) 
